

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

TOP SECRET

Document No. 17
 No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
 Class. Changed to: TS s G 179
 Next Review Date: 27 FEB 1979
 Ref: HR 70-3
 No: 27 FEB 1979

From: 22 November 1950
 To : 29 November 1950
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Department of the Army
 Washington 25, D. C.
 30 November 1950

No. 17

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications point to Communist intentions to insist upon a solution of Far East problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. In seeking such a solution, the Chinese Communists are prepared to increase the scale of current military operations. The Soviets are fully aware that Chinese Communist actions have increased and continue to increase the possibility of war. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies intend to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities. Communist intransigence may represent a carefully planned program to coerce the West into compliance with Communist demands, but there are no indications that the Communists are ready to compromise.
- b. Chinese Communist preparations for the prosecution of a major offensive effort in Korea continue and there are indirect indications to suggest that they may also intend a military intervention in Indo-China. There are indications of possible coups in Burma and Thailand which might eventually bring those countries under Communist control.
- c. Available intelligence does not indicate a probability of imminent military action in Europe or the Near East but there are continuing indications of the build-up of the Satellite armed forces.
- d. Soviet tactics appear increasingly designed to foster neutral tendencies in the West and to divide and weaken the Western Powers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA-CHINA.--Enemy forces now committed in Korea are preponderantly Chinese Communist, and there are indications of a continuing Chinese Communist effort to reinforce Korea and of extensive preparations in China for a major military effort. There are reports of preparations for full Chinese mobilization, of continuing army recruiting, and of an accelerated build-up of air strength. Chinese purchasing agents in Hong Kong apparently anticipate a possibility of full-scale war during December and are seeking immediate delivery on nearly all purchases. Chinese propaganda continues to emphasize that the U.S. is to be forced out of Korea, and the Soviet publication of the Sino-Soviet treaty calls attention to the Soviet commitments to China.
- b. INDO-CHINA.--Chinese Communist propaganda charging the French with repeated violations of Chinese territory may indicate an intent to intervene in Indo-China although there are no reliable military indications as yet that such action is imminent. Viet Minh pressure at numerous points continues to tie down the French forces, and the threat to Hanoi is increasing.
- c. THAILAND-BURMA.--There are indications of possible coups in both Thailand and Burma which might eventually bring these countries under Communist control without a military invasion, and Chinese Communist propaganda against the present Thai government is increasing.
- d. SCANDINAVIA.--There is no reliable evidence to confirm recent rumors that the U.S.S.R. is seeking to establish radar stations in Finland although such a Soviet request would be logical.
- e. EASTERN EUROPE.--There are no current indications of unusual Soviet military activity in Europe. Soviet military representatives in Vienna are again making conciliatory gestures toward Austria. The trend in the Satellite countries continues to indicate a major Soviet interest in the development of these armies into effective combat forces, but there is no clear indication of a definite timetable for the completion of the reorganization and rearming of these forces. Some further tightening of security measures continues in Eastern Europe.
- f. GENERAL.--The present Soviet policy is evidently designed to bring heavy pressure against the West on many issues and there is no indication that a settlement on Korea would result in a lessening of Soviet aggressiveness. There are increasing indications of Soviet attempts to foster neutralistic tendencies and to divide and weaken the Western Powers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
29 November 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. The heavy commitment of Chinese Communist forces in the enemy counteroffensive in Korea, the evidence of continuing Chinese Communist preparations for large-scale operations in Korea, and general Chinese military and political preparedness measures point to a major offensive effort in Korea, and a Chinese decision to risk immediate and major retaliatory action by the United States.


- (1) Enemy forces now committed in Korea are preponderantly Chinese Communist. Five Chinese Communist Armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42d and 66th) have been definitely identified in North Korea and two others (the 20th and 50th) are probably South of the Yalu in the zone of operations. The total strength of these forces is estimated at approximately 157,000, and with additional Army headquarters troops and other possible combat units the total Chinese Communist strength in Korea approaches 200,000. An estimated 70,000 North Korean troops are in the immediate combat zone. Further evidence that the Chinese Communists have assumed the major responsibility for the enemy counteroffensive is the fact that no North Korean prisoners have been captured in the past few days in the U. S. 8th Army area. Identification of the 20th Army which is subordinate to the Chinese Communist Third Field Army, formerly along the Chekiang coast, is the first indication of the presence of elements of this Field Army in Korea. Present estimates are that approximately 230,000 additional Chinese Communist field force troops are in Manchuria and readily available as reinforcements for Korea.
- (2) Concurrent with the enemy offensive, air observations indicated a continuous stream of enemy troops and heavy vehicular traffic moving towards the front by day as well as at night, and a renewal of truck and rail movements in rear areas. These observations indicate that supplies are being pushed to the front despite the danger of air attack and that a determined effort is being made to furnish logistical support to front line units. There has been little indication to date that the Chinese forces in Korea possess any large amounts of Soviet equipment, although they are equipped with mortars, rockets and recoilless weapons. The American prisoners who were returned by

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

the Chinese Communists reported no apparent shortage of materials and food, although they observed no tanks or heavy artillery. They returned Americans stated that the Chinese appeared confident that their superior numbers would overcome the American advantage in weapons.

- (3) In addition to the immediate Chinese Communist effort in Korea, information from China continued to indicate major preparations for an extended military effort. Little additional information on northward troop movement was received, suggesting that major redeployments may have been largely completed. A report that 4,000 Soviet officers and enlisted men with some artillery passed through Tientsin, coming from Manchuria, may indicate that a large Soviet advisory group has been moved to the Shantung Peninsula for the purpose of training Third Field Army units now probably deployed in this area. The area between Tientsin and Tsingtao is reported to be the scene of particularly covert and sensitive military activity. Secret mobilization instructions have reportedly been issued to all political organizations in South China directing that they increase production capacity, install an air defense and communications net, expand propaganda warfare, prevent the activities of enemy agents, provide means for caring for families of service men, rezone their areas for rationing, and make preparations for the assembling of all equipment useful to the military. According to this report, the time of mobilization, with additional instructions, was to be issued by the Central Military Committee. Other reports have indicated that continuing efforts are being made to recruit "volunteers" for the army, that some students were reportedly ordered to report for service in Korea during January and February 1951, that doctors and nurses are being recruited, and that a large student officers' training program is being launched. Some additional reports of evacuations of factories from Manchuria and of strengthening of defenses on the South China coast have been received.
- (4) Despite the recent lack of encounters with enemy aircraft in Korea, numerous reports continue to indicate a build-up in Chinese Communist air strength in North China and Manchuria and all indications appear to point to an early and substantial Communist air effort in the Korean theater. In addition, several reports of considerable air preparations in South and Central China and of the stockpiling of gasoline have been received.



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

- (6) Several reports that the "international clique" of the Chinese Communist Party is now in full control, though not in themselves of high reliability, appear confirmed by the general Chinese Communist course of action. Chinese Communist propaganda has continued to emphasize that the U.S. will be forced out of Korea and that the showdown with

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

American imperialism is imminent. There has also been some mention in Communist propaganda of the fact that the U.S. is unprepared and does not want to fight the Chinese. The publication of the Sino-Soviet treaty in the Moscow press has again served to emphasize Soviet obligations to China, and the entire course of Chinese action would appear to indicate a definite Soviet commitment to China. Although there is no evidence of what the Chinese may have been promised, the risks they have assumed would indicate that they anticipate a major readjustment of the power position in the Far East and that their actions have been timed in full agreement with the U.S.S.R.

b. In Indo-China, an indication that the Chinese Communists may be preparing for intervention there, also, was contained in propaganda charges that the French had violated the Chinese border on sixty occasions during the past year. Similar propaganda charges preceded the Chinese intervention in Korea by several weeks. It may be that these charges are the political preparation for possible Chinese military action in Indo-China. The fact that U.S. aid will not become effective for several weeks also increases the danger that the Chinese Communists might lend sufficient immediate aid, covertly, if possible, to insure a successful Viet Minh attack in the Delta area. The first open acknowledgment of Soviet assistance to the Viet Minh has also appeared in a Tass dispatch reporting a telegram from the Viet Minh Communist Party to the Soviet Communist Party which expressed gratitude for the aid which the U.S.S.R. had furnished to the Viet Minh liberation movement. Despite these propaganda developments, however, there is no firm evidence of a movement of Chinese Communist forces closer to the Indo-China border, although unconfirmed reports of such a movement have been received

Chinese Communist aircraft, including jets, are reported to have arrived recently on Hainan Island. Military activity in Indo-China during the past week showed no change in Viet Minh tactics. Strong Viet Minh pressure against Dinh Lap and Moncay caused a further deterioration in the French northeast defensive positions, continued Viet Minh infiltration into the Delta area has increased Viet Minh capabilities to sabotage lines of communication and poses a serious threat to Hanoi, and Viet Minh attacks in Central and South Vietnam keep all available French and Vietnamese forces committed. The threat to Laos continues but has to date been contained by the French and Thai tribesmen.

c. In both Burma and Thailand, there are indications of possible coup d'etats which might conceivably bring the Communists to power. In Burma, General Ne Win, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has maneuvered himself into a position where he can seize control of the government, although it is impossible to predict what his political orientation would be if he should decide to take control. In Thailand, increased propaganda emanating from Peiping has described the present Premier as a "puppet of United States imperialism," and there are simultaneous although unconfirmed reports of internal plots which threaten the stability of the present government and

TOP SECRET

25X1C

TOP SECRET

which may return Pridi Phanomyang to power. It is possible that Pridi has come under the influence of the Communists. These developments suggest a new phase in the Communist program for the conquest of Southeast Asia.

d. There is no new information with regard to the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet.

e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) The Chinese Communists have begun and are making preparations to continue an all-out offensive effort in Korea and have thereby assumed a risk of immediate and major retaliatory action by the United States.
- (2) There are some indications to suggest that the Chinese Communists may also intend a military intervention in Indo-China although available military information at the moment does not indicate a change from their previous tactics of extensive logistical and training assistance to the Viet Minh.
- (3) There are inconclusive indications of coups in Burma and Thailand which might eventually bring those countries under Communist control.
- (4) Military and political indications point to Chinese Communist intentions to insist upon a solution of Far East problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. In seeking such a solution, the Chinese Communists are prepared to increase the scale of current military operations and to increase the possibility of war.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. Despite denials from Finland of any unusual Soviet pressure on that country, rumors are current that the U.S.S.R. has proposed to Finland that the Soviets set up a number of radar stations on Finnish territory, with equipment and possibly personnel to be supplied by the U.S.S.R. Reliable information appears to indicate that Finnish Prime Minister Kekkonen is himself the source of these rumors, although his reasons for circulating them are not entirely clear. Despite the lack of reliable evidence that the U.S.S.R. has advanced such a proposal, it does appear logical that the U.S.S.R. would seek to secure such concessions prior to the launching of hostilities in Europe as the Soviet frontier from Leningrad north is highly vulnerable due to a lack of early warning installations in the Baltic area.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

b. There continue to be no indications of unusual Soviet military activity in Europe. Information from Germany indicates that a substantial number of older troops have returned to the U.S.S.R. for probable discharge and that the small increase in Soviet troop strength there is probably temporary. No abnormal rail traffic has been noted across Poland, and observations have failed to confirm rumors of Soviet requisitioning of a training area and accommodations in Silesia.

c. A late report from Austria states that members of the Soviet repatriation missions in both the U.S. and French Zones announced their intentions to depart suddenly for Vienna on the afternoon of 29 November on what is apparently an urgent trip. There is no information as to the reasons for this or whether it is in fact of significance, although there is no precedent for such action. The Soviet commander in Austria is now on a "holiday" in the U.S.S.R. Recent Soviet political activity in Austria has been marked by renewed gestures at conciliation and reiterations that the U.S.S.R. desires to iron out all difficulties with the Austrians in frank discussions. There has been no additional Soviet interference with Austrian government prerogatives.

d. The recent seizure in the United States of a shipment of U.S. military uniforms destined for Holland is of interest in connection with earlier unconfirmed reports that considerable quantities of U.S. uniforms were being smuggled into the Soviet Zone of Germany. Confirmation that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring U.S. uniforms in quantity would be a significant indication, as infiltration is an important element of Soviet tactical doctrine and would obviously be greatly facilitated by the possession of U.S. uniforms.

e. No major new developments have been reported in the Satellite armed forces, although additional information supported previously noted trends. There is now adequate evidence that the Hungarian Army has expanded in recent months to a probable strength of three rifle divisions and one mechanized division and that cadres for several other divisions have been established. It is noteworthy that the Hungarian Army has received heavier and more modern Soviet equipment than that issued to Soviet divisions in Austria. Recent observations in Czechoslovakia suggest that there may have been some regrouping of Czech Army units within critical restricted areas, and there is evidence that bridges throughout Slovakia are either being reinforced or new construction started. An unconfirmed report states that a reorganization of the Czech Army into army corps rather than military districts is under way, which would indicate a trend towards tactical rather than administrative organization which has also been noted in other Satellites. There is fairly reliable evidence that a Soviet admiral now commands the Polish Navy. The plans for the organization of the East German Alert police into tactical units are reported still in the formative stage but there are additional indications that a reorganization is under way and that medical personnel are being recruited. The trend throughout the Satellites continues to indicate a major Soviet interest in the build-up of these armies into effective combat forces, suggesting a definite intention to use them for more than internal security purposes.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

f. Recently available information indicates that some 24 radio stations for the reporting of aircraft movements have been set up along the Soviet interzonal boundary in Germany since approximately the end of April. A new type early warning radar is being set up near Pilsen, Czechoslovakia and is the first evidence of the expected installation of new radar stations to support air operations from new airfields under construction in Bohemia.

g. Some additional tightening of security precautions has been reported in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In the latter country, Western observers were already restricted from virtually all areas of significant military activity. There is fairly reliable evidence that a new elite security force has been established in Bulgaria. The Soviet announcement of a new medal for the militia makes specific mention of service in the liquidation of bandits, indicating that dissident activity may be a fairly serious difficulty in some areas or that an increase is anticipated.

h. Soviet press treatment of the Iranian-Soviet trade agreement is emphasizing the generous Soviet policy towards Iran (in contrast to that of the U.S. and Great Britain) and suggests a heightening interest in the fostering of neutralistic tendencies in this area.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. There are strong indications that the Soviet Union's present policy is designed to bring heavy pressure on the West to accept the Soviet position on all issues of controversy and is not limited to a settlement of the war in Korea. The Soviet Union has firmly identified a solution of the Korean war with U.S. rearmament of Japan, with U.S. aggression against Formosa, Indo-China and other areas of Southeast Asia and with the remilitarization of West Germany.

b. There are indications that the Soviets are attempting in private conversations to probe out the French position on the rearmament of West Germany and to remind the French of the dangers to them of a rearmed Germany. Although such propaganda is not new, these efforts appear to have been recently intensified.


c. There are no indications of a reduction of Soviet shipping outside of Communist waters and the number now in foreign waters is the highest in several months.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Available intelligence does not indicate the probability of imminent Soviet or Satellite military action in Europe or the Near East. There is continuing evidence of the build-up of the Satellite armies into effective combat forces but there is no clear indication of a definite timetable for the completion of the reorganization and rearming of these forces. There are continuing indications of a further tightening of security in Eastern Europe.
- (2) The present Soviet policy is designed to bring heavy pressure against the West on many issues and there is no indication that a settlement on Korea would result in a lessening of Soviet aggressiveness. There are increasing indications of Soviet attempts to foster neutralistic tendencies and to divide and weaken the Western powers.


JOHN WECKERLING

Brigadier General, GSC

Chairman, Joint Intelligence

Indications Committee

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200022-3

Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200022-3